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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses response behaviour during an evacuation caused by a fire that occurred 
late on a Friday night in a three storey building housing socially vulnerable people. One escape 
corridor became smoke logged. Twenty people were observed on CCTV during the evacuation with 
one person choosing to enter the smoke filled corridor to alert a friend. No-one was injured by the fire 
or during the evacuation. The paper considers response behaviour, travel speed and exit selection 
based on analysis of CCTV from inside the building. Behaviour exhibited by the residents was similar 
to that expected within a domestic dwelling rather than a hotel and average walk speeds were found to 
be larger than those normally used in engineering analysis.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fire at the Empire Theatre, Edinburgh, on 9 May 1911, is often cited as the origin of the 
convention that it should take 2½ minutes to evacuate a building. Contemporary newspapers also 
report some interesting human behaviour. Theatregoers originally thought that the fire was part of the 
act and delayed their evacuation then made a ‘rush for the door’ and ‘… while there was crushing and 
some danger of being trampled ….. the ample exits enabled the building to be emptied in about 3 
minutes …’1 It is well known that the manager, Mr C B Fountaine, ordered the band to play God Save 
the King as the audience of approximately 3000 people safely evacuated; it is not so well known that 
one of the musicians was killed. The safety curtain was lowered but 10 performers and staff, including 
the illusionist Sigmund Ignatius Neuburger (The Great Lafayette) were killed. Reports suggest some 
backstage exits had been locked and that Neuberger was killed as he re-entered the building to try to 
save his animals1,2. Since then there have been multiple fire incidents resulting in many casualties. 
Some of these such as the MGM Grand Hotel in 1980, World Trade Centre in 2001, and the Rhode 
Island Station Nightclub in 2003 have been studied in detail using interviews with survivors, 
deductive work and some film evidence3-7. However, the majority of quantitative information relating 
to human behaviour in fire is based on experimental evidence and observation of non-emergency 
behaviour8,9. Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue Service (DSFRS) attended a fire, which started in 
a fluorescent light fitting, at Alexandra House, Exmouth, at 22:56 in November 2012. The building 
owners have provided CCTV covering approximately 68 minutes before the fire as well as the fire 
and evacuation itself. This video footage provides an opportunity to study and quantify response 
phase behaviour of vulnerable people subjected to a real fire incident and is the subject of this paper.  
 
The evacuation process is considered to comprise of two broad phases the; Response Phase and 
Evacuation Movement Phase8.  In this work we are primarily concerned with the Response Phase.  
The Response Phase can be categorised into three stages: Notification, Cognition and Activity; where 
the Cognition and Activity Stages run in parallel8. The Notification stage occurs when initial cues 
(such as alarms, the appearance of smoke or the behaviour of others) are conveyed to occupants, 
indicating an event that may require evacuation. This stage ends when occupants begin responding to 
the cues mentally and/or physically, thus entering the Cognition and Activity stages. During the 
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Cognition stage, occupants interpret the Notification cues and other sources of information and decide 
on activities. The Activity stage begins when occupants perform a series of tasks which were 
conceived during the Cognition stage, such as collecting their belongings (an Action Task) or 
communicating with others (Information Task).  The end of the Activity stage denotes the end of the 
Response Phase and the beginning of the Evacuation Movement Phase.  The response time 
(sometimes called pre-movement time) measures the duration of the Response Phase (start of the 
alarm to the end of the Activity Stage)8. Responses may be affected by a variety of factors such as 
culture, training, previous experience, familiarity with the building, interpersonal relationships and 
peer group behaviour. 
 
BUILDING, OCCUPANCY AND INCIDENT 
  
Alexandra House is a three storey building in Exmouth UK. Formerly a YWCA hostel it was 
converted into flats housing socially vulnerable adults. The building is L shaped, approximately 31 by 
27 metres; the main stair and entrance/exit is in the middle of the building with alternative stairs and 
exits at each extremity (see Figure 1), with the top (second) floor being identical in layout to the first 
floor. In Figure 1, the second floor flat numbers are shown in parentheses. Most of the ground floor, 
apart from the reception area is not visible on the CCTV. The smoke logged corridor is shown in grey. 
 
 
Figure 1: Simplified Building Layout Showing First Floor  
 
Alexandra House provides supported accommodation for single people over the age of 18 with 
housing-related needs such as drug and alcohol misuse, mental health needs, domestic abuse, physical 
disability, and sensory impairment. Staff are on site six days a week offering group work, help with 
basic skills and organising social activities and outings. There are 23 furnished self-contained flats 
where residents can stay for up to 2 years. The house provides a safe environment within a stable 
community in which residents can learn how to maintain a tenancy in preparation for a move on to 
independent living. Tenants are unsupervised overnight and at weekends. 
 
By the time this research was conducted all tenants present at the time of the fire had moved out of the 
building. At the time of the fire there are believed to have been at least 20 people in the building, 15 
residents and five visitors, eight people on the second floor, 10 on the first floor and two on the 
ground floor. The actions and behaviours of 20 people were observed during the fire on the CCTV 
footage. eight other people were observed but they left the building before the fire broke out.  
Information about procedures and people was provided by members of staff. At the time of the fire 
only one person had been living there for less than six months. Tenants have the fire procedures 
explained and are given a tour of the escape routes before they move in. The house manual is issued 
to each tenant and contains a section on fire procedures. Compliance with fire procedures and taking 
part in fire drills is a condition of the tenancy agreement which they sign before moving in. Non-
compliance, particularly failure to evacuate, is treated seriously and may result in a formal warning or 
even eviction. Fire drills are conducted every two to three months and sometimes include simulation 
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of an exit being unavailable. The building experiences a comparatively high number of small fires and 
false alarms. Prior to this incident in November there had been a small fire in a flat and a false alarm 
both during May so awareness of fire issues could have been heightened as the majority of tenants had 
previous experience of a fire in the building. 
 
Each of the people are numbered as part of the analysis with a summary description of the persons 
vulnerabilities presented in  
 
Person 26 (118s) is also located on the first floor.  He exits and locks his room and moves towards the 
stairs after 63s.  When he reaches the stairs he turns back and returns to his room, unlocks the door, 
enters, leaves, locks the door and starts his evacuation.  Thus two of the lone people started their 
evacuation relatively quickly but returned to their room thereby delaying their response time.  Thus all 
those alone responded in about 60s but two delayed their response by returning to their rooms.  
 
It was not possible to observe the transition from Notification to Cognition and Start of Activity for 
most of the people as they were out of sight of the CCTV.  Only four people did not undertake any 
Action or Information Tasks whilst being observed during the Response Phase. Three of these 
originated in the same room which they left between 33 and 36 s after AAT. The other person who 
commenced evacuation without their response time being observed left their room 39 s after AAT. 
 
Table 5.  It is worth noting that one of the residents had mobility difficulty due to spina bifida (16) 
and one person had a sight impairment (19).  The five visitors were numbered 11, 17, 22, 23 and 24. 
 
The first signs of fire are visible in the security video at 22:48:17 in the first floor corridor between 
flats 10 and 13 (see Figure 7a). A glow develops and smoke starts to fill the corridor. The nearest 
smoke detector is 7 m from the light fitting; the alarm activates 157 s after the first signs of fire. 
Visibility in the corridor is virtually nil within 7 min. DSFRS received a 999 call from a male caller 
via mobile phone at 22:49:06; this suggests that the clocks on the CCTV and fire service recording 
system are not synchronised. The caller stated that everyone had left the building.  The fire started in 
the electronics of a recessed twin tube fluorescent light fitting that is approximately 1.2 m x 0.3 m. 
This type of fire is quite common and is usually confined to the electronics however, in this case, it 
spread to involve the opaque polystyrene diffuser. Approximately 50% of the diffuser was consumed. 
Burning droplets of polystyrene fell onto the carpet (see Figures 2 and 3). 
 
 
Figure 2: Exemplar undamaged light fitting Figure 3: Remains of light diffuser on carpet 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The CCTV was provided AJP file format and viewed using Backup CD Player10. The file 
contains images from 8 separate CCTV cameras; the locations of cameras used in the analysis are 
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summarised in table 1. Not all of the building and escape routes are covered by cameras. The cameras 
are motion activated and images are stamped with date and time.  
 
Table 1 Position of CCTV Cameras 
Camera Target Camera Target 
1 Main entrance 5 1st floor corridor (looking east) 
2 Reception area 6 1st floor corridor (looking north) 
3 Common Room 7 2nd floor corridor (looking east) 
4 Rear car park (not used) 8 2nd floor corridor (looking north) 
 
DSFRS had basic plans of the building but these were not drawn to scale. Nevertheless they formed a 
useful starting point for the preparation of CAD plans using TurboCAD11. The building was visited 
and key dimensions taken using a laser measuring device. The plans of the corridors, location of 
doors, staircases and areas visible on the CCTV cameras were then updated to an accuracy of 
approximately 1 cm; the remainder of the building is represented in outline detail only. A number of 
waypoints were created at the centre of each relevant doorway, at the foot of the main staircase and at 
the sofa in the living room. The distance between each waypoint along the centre line of the corridors 
was calculated using the measurement function of TurboCAD11; it was assumed that people leaving a 
room would reach the centre line of the corridor by the time they drew level with the door jamb. 
Travel distance on flights of stairs was calculated as the hypotenuse of a right angle triangle 
determined by multiplying the number of steps by the rise (height) and the going (length). Distance 
travelled by each person was calculated as the sum of the stages between the waypoints crossed for 
each person. 
 
The images were analysed frame by frame and 28 people identified. Some people left the building 
before the fire. Data were gathered for these people to determine movement speeds in normal 
conditions. The time of events was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and analysed. The time 
of each movement event was taken to be the time that person actually crossed the door threshold or 
other waypoint. Walking speed was calculated by dividing the distance by the time intervals between 
waypoints visible on a single camera. Speeds were not determined if: travel distances were less than 
5.3m, doors were opened/closed, person was running or if there were several steps in the path. Each 
person was allocated a code by sequential number of appearance in the timeline, gender, group 
association, as well as floor and room of origin at the Alarm Activation Time (AAT).  For example, 
Person 10, male, in group at AAT, second floor, room 20 is coded as, 10-m-Gr-2-20; while Person 18, 
female, alone at AAT, second floor room 19 is coded as, 18-f-S-2-19).  The building has an automatic 
fire detection system. Some doors are held open by magnetic devices that release on the activation of 
the fire alarm. Simultaneous closing of doors was taken as the AAT. Individual behaviour was 
analysed using criteria determined in the BeSeCu8 project, with key definitions presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Key Definitions Used in Behaviour Analysis8 
Term Definition Term Definition 
Alarm 
Activation Time 
(AAT) 
The time that the fire alarm 
sounded. 
End 
Response 
Phase (ERP) 
Time a person is seen to 
start purposeful movement 
towards the exit. 
Start Cognition 
Stage (SCS) 
Person responds to alarm by 
mentally or physically 
disengaging from previous task 
and recognising that something 
unusual may be occurring. 
Exit Time person crosses 
threshold of final exit 
Start Activity 
Stage (SAS) 
The activity stage starts when the 
occupant performs a series of 
information and/or action tasks 
which were conceived during the 
Cognition stage. 
Action Task Involves the occupant 
physically undertaking 
activity e.g. locking a door, 
putting on clothing, 
moving to another location 
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for another action 
Response time Time from Alarm Activation to 
End Response Phase  
Information 
Task 
Seeking providing or 
exchanging information 
concerning the incident or 
course of action. 
Notification 
Time 
Time from Alarm Activation to 
Start of Activity 
Activity 
Time 
Time from Start of 
Activity to End Response 
 
However, as CCTV is not available in the rooms of the occupants the analysis cannot cover all the 
activities that a person may undertake before starting their evacuation.  Analysis is limited to the point 
when the occupants exit their room.  As a result, the SAS was only recorded if a person was observed 
doing something other than heading straight for the exit. If no activity was observed the first sighting 
was considered to be ERP and an activity time of 0 seconds recorded. Persons 14 and 16 started in 
rooms over 7m from the first point of observation so were not included in calculations of SAS Stage.  
Two people exhibited atypical behaviour. The house policy is for tenants to evacuate immediately; 
however one tenant decided to investigate the alarm, confirming the fire and then performing a sweep 
of the building to ensure that everyone had left. In this case ERP was taken as the time when he had 
confirmed the presence of fire and started to move around the building informing others. A second 
person had commenced his own evacuation but decided to ensure that a friend, who may have been 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was able to evacuate by going to his flat via the fire affected 
corridor. In this case ERP was taken to be the time that he entered the corridor. Neither of these two 
people were observed leaving the building because their exit was not covered by a camera. 
 
The number of people responding in 10 s ‘bins’ was determined for each phase and presented in bar 
graph format as a probability (i.e. number ÷ population) because different population sizes were 
observed during different phases of activity. A log-normal distribution curve was determined for each 
parameter using equation 1 and superimposed on each graph8,12.  
 
݂(ݔ) = ଵ√ଶగ	×	௫	ఙ exp−(
(୪୬௫ି	ఓమ)
ଶ	×	ఙమ	 )    [1] 
 
 
Where:  μ = Mean 
  σ = Standard deviation 
 
The distance to alternative exits from their location at AAT and the difference between distance 
travelled and the shortest possible distance were calculated for each person. 
 
There are several acknowledged limitations in this work.  These include the following:  
• As the sample of 20 people is comparatively small, population performance outliers can 
significantly skew distributions.  As a result, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions and so the 
observed behaviours should be considered as exemplars of possible behaviour rather than 
definitive descriptions of typical behaviour. 
• Only two people were in view of the cameras when the alarm activated; as a result the SAS is 
likely to be overestimated because there are no data relating to activities inside the flats. 
• Escape routes were measured to an accuracy of less than 0.01 m for each section. These 
measurements have been transferred to a CAD plan and the route travelled estimated as the 
distance between waypoints along the centre line of the corridor. In reality people did not 
follow the route precisely however this method is believed to be a reasonable approximation. 
• There is a greater margin of error in estimating the time each person passed a waypoint. This 
is due to a combination of the coarse frame rate (the cameras are motion activated and in 
some cases the time between frames exceeded 1 s) and that in some cases people are at a 
considerable distance from the camera. To minimise the error, only travel distances greater 
than 5.3m are considered however, these estimated speeds are still subject to error.  
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• CCTV cameras are positioned for general security rather than monitoring an evacuation; this 
means that some interesting events are obscured or completely out of view. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
It is noted that while the CCTV did not include sound it can be inferred that there is a growing 
amount of ‘chatter’ and awareness that there is a real fire in the building. Response times, behaviour 
and travel speed should be interpreted in this context.  The evacuation population consisted of 11 
males and 9 females ranging in age from 18 to the early 50s.  A summary of the main results is 
presented in Error! Reference source not found., which is sorted by response time. Ages have been 
grouped into late teens (18-20), and then by decades i.e. twenties, thirties etc.   
 
 
 
Group Behaviour 
 
In this type of accommodation, where there are a small number of single residents (no couples or 
families), who are in residence for extended periods of time and who share common challenges, it is 
likely that social groups will form.  It is informative to explore the impact that such social bonds may 
have on the evacuation dynamics, in particular investigating if groups had a rapid or slow response to 
the alarm and if they evacuated as a group.  If residents were in social groups at the time of the alarm, 
it may be expected that they will maintain their group structure and evacuate as a group.   
 
In this particular case 65% (13/20) of the population were associated with five groups ranging in size 
from 2 to 4 at the time of the evacuation.  These consisted of: 3 groups of 2, 1 group of 3 and 1 group 
of 4. Seven people were on their own at the time the alarm sounded: 4 females and 3 males (see  
 
Table 3). Analysis of the video footage suggests that three of the five groups, g1, g2 and g4 did not 
evacuate as a group.  One person in g1 (12) leaves the TV lounge to investigate the alarm, returns to 
the room, informs girlfriend (11) and leaves the room before 11 is ready.  They eventually reunite just 
prior to exiting the building. One person in g2 (13) decided to check on a friend before commencing 
his evacuation and the other member of g2 (28) did not follow.  A member of g4 (10) took on a staff 
role and went around the building alerting people, thus this persons response time is deemed to have 
ended when he started his investigation.  Person 9 went to investigate the fire while person 27 stayed 
in the room for 118s, left the room, engaged in 84s of action/information tasks, walked to the stairs 
and then returned to her room, spent 28s in the room then left, generating a response time of 202s.  
 
Table 3: Population Characteristics 
Status at time 
of alarm 
Male Female Group ID and 
person # 
Group Nature Response 
Time (s) 
Evacuated 
as group? 
Single 3 4 14,16,18,25,19, 
15,26 
- -,-,30,39,43, 
64,118 
- 
Group-Pair 1 1 g1 (11, 12) 11  female 
visitor, TV room, 
grd floor 
112, 103 No 
Group-Pair 1 1 g2 (13, 28) 28  mental health 106, 122 No 
Group-Pair 2 0 g3 (17, 20) 17  visitor 42,43 Yes 
Group-Three 1 2 g4 (9, 10, 27) 27  drug/alcohol 156,31,202 No 
Group-Four 3 1 g5 (21, 22, 23, 24) 22,23,24  visitor 33,35,36,37 Yes 
 
Only two groups maintained the group structure and evacuated as groups (g3 and g5).  Both of these 
groups responded quite early, in less than 60s and both groups involved male visitors and hence 
people without additional social connectivity with the other residents in the building.  One group 
involving a female visitor had a long response time and also did not evacuate as a group as a member 
of the group went to investigate the alarm.  Each of the groups that did not evacuate as a group did so 
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n 18 10 8 
 
In total 10 people responded in less than 60s.  Of these four were visitors (17, 22, 23, 24), three of 
which were members of g5 and one of which was a member of g2.  Two others were residents and 
members of these two groups (21, 20).  Another person (10) took on the role of a staff member and 
investigated the fire and alerted others.  The remaining three people were alone at the time of the 
alarm (18, 19, 25). Of the seven people that are known to be alone at the time of the alarm, response 
times for two people (14 and 16) could not be determined.  Of the remaining five people who are 
known to be alone at the time of the alarm, three people respond in less than 60s (18, 30s; 19, 43s; and 
25, 39s).  The remaining two took longer than 60s.  Person 15 (64s) is located on the fire floor (first 
floor) in her room at the time of the alarm. She is seen to respond quite quickly and exits her room 
after 37s wearing night clothes.  She gets as far as the stairs and returns to her flat, enters and comes 
out holding a pair of shoes and continues her evacuation.  Her return to her flat to collect her shoes 
delayed her response.   
 
Person 26 (118s) is also located on the first floor.  He exits and locks his room and moves towards the 
stairs after 63s.  When he reaches the stairs he turns back and returns to his room, unlocks the door, 
enters, leaves, locks the door and starts his evacuation.  Thus two of the lone people started their 
evacuation relatively quickly but returned to their room thereby delaying their response time.  Thus all 
those alone responded in about 60s but two delayed their response by returning to their rooms.  
 
It was not possible to observe the transition from Notification to Cognition and Start of Activity for 
most of the people as they were out of sight of the CCTV.  Only four people did not undertake any 
Action or Information Tasks whilst being observed during the Response Phase. Three of these 
originated in the same room which they left between 33 and 36 s after AAT. The other person who 
commenced evacuation without their response time being observed left their room 39 s after AAT. 
 
Table 5: Summary of key results sorted by response time 
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18-f-S-2-19 40 26 4 30 26.23 1.3  1.1 MH (NW) 
10-m-Gr-2-20 18 4 27 31 35.14 2.5 g4 1.2g4 1.7 g4 ADHD, CL 
21-f-Gr-1-8 20 33 0 33 2.34 1.8 g5  1.2 g5 CL 
22-m-Gr-1-8 V 35 0 35 2.34 1.4 g5  1.2 g5 Visitor 
23-m-Gr-1-8 V 36 0 36 2.34 1.8 g5  1.2 g5 Visitor 
24-m-Gr-1-8 V 37 0 37 2.34 1.8 g5  1.1 g5 Visitor 
25-m-S-2-17 30 39 0 39 27.95 1.3  0.8 D/A HL 
17-m-Gr-1-5 V 25 17 42 15.59 1.2 g3  1.1 g3 Visitor 
19-f-S-2-18 20 32 11 43 22.92 1.8  0.8 LD, VI (NW) 
20-m-Gr-1-5 19 32 11 43 15.59 1.2 g3  1.1 g3 CL 
15-f-S-1-7 19 37 27 64 10.34 1.8 1.1 1.6 (NW) 
12-m-Gr-g-CR 20 63 40 103 33.48 1.2 g1  N/O  
13-m-Gr-1-9 30 96 10 106 0 1.7smoke 1.1 N/O g2 HL 
11-f-Gr-g CR V 92 20 112 33.48 1.6 g1  N/O Visitor 
26-m-S-1-4 20 63 55 118 8.46 1.2  1.4 HL 
28-f-Gr-1-9 20 94 28 122 0 1.7 g2  1.2 g2 MH 
9-f-Gr-2-20 20 40 116 156 35.14 2.3 g4 1.1g4 1.1 g4  
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27-f-Gr-2-20 30 118 84 202 35.14 1.4 g4  1.2 g4 D/A, HL 
14-f-S-g-2 50 N/O N/O N/O 23.86 -- 0.4 N/O MH, LD 
16-m-S-2-22 19 N/O N/O N/O 40.76 1.2  0.8 Mob 
Notes to table:  
1) Not everyone was observed during normal conditions. The Superscript g1-5 indicates when that 
person was in a group with one or more other people at the time the alarm sounded; the number 
indicates the group identification number (see table 3). The Superscript smoke indicates measured 
in smoke filled corridor 
2) N/O = Not observed; D/A = Drugs and/or alcohol; MH = mental health issues; LD = Learning 
difficulties; HL = Homeless; ADHD = Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; CL = Care 
Leaver; Mob = Mobility difficulty; VI = Vision Impairment; G = Guest. (NW) = dressed in 
nightwear. 
3) Ages are approximate: e.g. 18 = late teens (all tenants are over 18), 20 = twenties, 30 = 
thirties). 
4) Persons 14 and 16 originated in rooms more than 7m from the point of first observation so 
activities could not be calculated accurately.   
 
Excluding person 10 who took on the role of a member of staff, 13 people (72%) spent less than 30s 
engaged in activity tasks (see  
 
Person 26 (118s) is also located on the first floor.  He exits and locks his room and moves towards the 
stairs after 63s.  When he reaches the stairs he turns back and returns to his room, unlocks the door, 
enters, leaves, locks the door and starts his evacuation.  Thus two of the lone people started their 
evacuation relatively quickly but returned to their room thereby delaying their response time.  Thus all 
those alone responded in about 60s but two delayed their response by returning to their rooms.  
 
It was not possible to observe the transition from Notification to Cognition and Start of Activity for 
most of the people as they were out of sight of the CCTV.  Only four people did not undertake any 
Action or Information Tasks whilst being observed during the Response Phase. Three of these 
originated in the same room which they left between 33 and 36 s after AAT. The other person who 
commenced evacuation without their response time being observed left their room 39 s after AAT. 
 
Table 5) before starting positive movement to the exit.  However, it is again emphasised that these 
people may have been engaged in activities out of CCTV view. Of these, four people took longer than 
60s to respond (15, 64s; 13, 106s; 11, 112s and 28, 122s).  These are; person 11, the visitor in the TV 
lounge who waited for her friend to return; person 28 a member of g2 who was left on her own, it is 
noted that this person had mental health issues; person 13 also a member of g2 who left the room to 
alert others and person 15 who was on her own and returned to her room to collect a pair of shoes. 
The four people (12%) who spent more than 40 s engaged in activity tasks (26, 9, 27, 12) returned to 
their room of origin at least once.  
 
Of the 14 residents (excluding 10), four (9, 156s; 15, 64s; 26, 118s; 27, 202s) or 29% returned to their 
room prior to evacuating. Their response times varied from 64s to 202s. Furthermore, three residents 
(21%) prolonged their response by attempting to alert others (9, 156s; 12, 103s; 13, 106s) prior to 
evacuating.  Their response times varied from 103s to 156s.  Three residents attempt to investigate the 
fire (9, 10, 12).  Thus six or 43% of the residents either, investigated the fire, returned to their room or 
attempted to warn others with one resident assuming the role of a member of staff.  All those with a 
response time of less than 60s (excluding 10, but including the visitors, 18, 30s; 21, 33s; 22, 35s; 23, 
36s; 24, 37s; 25, 39s; 17, 42s; 20, 43s; 19, 43s) did not attempt to warn others and did not return to 
their room.  With the exception of 11 (112s) and 28 (122s), all those with a response time greater than 
60s (12, 103s; 9, 156s; 27, 202s; 13, 106s; 15, 64s; 26, 118s) either returned to their room, attempted 
to warn others or investigated the fire.  These activities clearly prolonged response times.  
 
It is interesting to note that three women wearing nightclothes (15, 18, 19) were some of the earliest 
people to respond with notification times of 37s, 26s and 32s respectively.  Two had short response 
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Females (7 on flat, 5 on stairs)   1.3 3.4 1.7 1.1 1.6 1.3 
Males (8 on flat, 7 on stairs) 1.2 1.8 1.4 0.8 1.4 1.1 
Person 16 (male, spina bifida) 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Person 19 (female, vision impaired) 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
 
Exit Choice 
 
Most of the people (18 out of 20) left the building by the main entrance/exit. The main exit was in fact 
the correct choice, i.e. the shortest and most direct route that avoided the hazard zone, for 10 of the 
occupants. However, for 10 people there was a shorter exit route available. For four of these people 
the difference was negligible, less than 3 m (approximately 2 s) longer. However for 6 people the 
additional distance travelled ranged between 5.4m and 20.9 m or 29-125%. The person who travelled 
the furthest extra distance had mobility difficulties due to spina bifida (16).  The assembly point for 
the residents is at the front of the building. Although people may not have left by the nearest available 
exit, their route choice may have been a logical choice in that it was the shortest distance to the 
assembly point and they did not need to pass through the hazard zone. Thus, the residents may not 
have simply been using the main exit because it was their most familiar exit route.  Thus the desire to 
minimise travel distance (hence time) to the final destination during an evacuation may be a point that 
should be recognised by fire engineers who design fire strategies, escape routes and training for 
building occupants. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The evacuation of a three storey building housing socially vulnerable people subjected to a 
real fire was studied using CCTV footage.  The fire occurred late at night when some 15 residents and 
5 visitors were present without the support of housing staff.  While 65% of the population were 
associated with five social groups at the sounding of the alarm, only two of the groups actually 
evacuated as groups.  The groups that evacuated as individuals did so because some or all of the group 
members decided to either investigate the incident, return to their rooms or to warn others.  This type 
of behaviour is similar to that observed in residential dwelling fires rather than hotel fires.  The groups 
that evacuated as groups involved visitors without the need to investigate or warn others.  Overall, the 
response times ranged from 30s to 202s and were distributed in the typical log-normal manner. Those 
with a response time less than 60s did not attempt to warn others, investigate the fire or return to their 
rooms. Undertaking these activities – which 43% of the resident population attempted – prolonged 
response times. There appears to be no relationship between proximity to the fire and response time. 
 
Average walk speeds on the flat for those without disabilities ranged from 1.2 m/s to 1.7 m/s with an 
overall average of 1.5 m/s, with females walking faster than males on average. Both stair and flat 
average walk speeds were greater than would normally be used in engineering calculations however; 
the limitations in measurement methodology must be taken into consideration. Ten people chose the 
‘correct’ exit, i.e. the shortest and safest route, but 10 people chose the main exit which was actually 
further than they needed to travel. For three of these the difference was negligible but seven people 
travelled more than 29% further than they needed to. This should be seen in the context that the final 
destination was outside the main exit. The time required for 19 people to evacuate the building was 3 
min 50 s. 
 
Finally, design engineers may legitimately assume that the evacuation performance of residents in this 
type of facility is likely to be similar to that found in hotels, albeit with delayed response and reduced 
walking speeds. However, this analysis suggests that the response behaviour is similar to that found in 
domestic dwelling fire situations with walk speeds better than would normally be expected. When 
considering these types of facilities it is however essential to take into consideration the nature of the 
resident’s vulnerabilities and the level of fire safety training received as part of their residency.  
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